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Abstract—The introduction of data analytics into medicine has
changed the nature of patient treatment. In this, patients are
asked to disclose personal information such as genetic markers,
lifestyle habits, and clinical history. This data is then used by
statistical models to predict personalized treatments. However,
due to privacy concerns, patients often desire to withhold sensitive
information. This self-censorship can impede proper diagnosis
and treatment, which may lead to serious health complications
and even death over time. In this paper, we present privacy
distillation, a mechanism which allows patients to control the
type and amount of information they wish to disclose to the
healthcare providers for use in statistical models. Meanwhile, it
retains the accuracy of models that have access to all patient data
under a sufficient but not full set of privacy-relevant information.
We validate privacy distillation using a corpus of patients
prescribed to warfarin for a personalized dosage. We use a deep
neural network to implement privacy distillation for training and
making dose predictions. We find that privacy distillation with
sufficient privacy-relevant information i) retains accuracy almost
as good as having all patient data (only 3% worse), and ii) is
effective at preventing errors that introduce health-related risks
(only 3.9% worse under- or over-prescriptions).
I. INTRODUCTION
Data analytics has introduced a sea change in modern
healthcare systems. In this, there are many advances in
computation that have the potential to impact society positively
on analytically driven personalized medicine [43]. This effort
has lead to Precision Medicine Initiative [21], announced in
2015. This initiative aims to pioneer data-driven healthcare to
treat and prevent disease, based on variability in patient data
such as genes, environment, and lifestyle.
Personalized medicine relies on building statistical mod-
els able to predict personalized treatments, tailored to the
characteristics of specific patients. In turn, developing such
statistical models call for large amounts of patient data.
However, in practice, patients often prefer not to divulge certain
kinds of data due to privacy concerns. For instance, social
stigma and discrimination concerns of patients suffering from
mental disorders and sexually transmitted disease, embarrassing
themselves in the presence of their physicians, lack of trust to
the medical providers are one of the many reasons [2], [5], [19],
[51]. In short, personalized medicine is based on statistical
models that call for large bodies of patient data, but patients
have different levels of willingness to expose their data1.
To illustrate this dilemma, consider the problem of per-
sonalized warfarin dosing. Warfarin is an oral anticoagulant
prescribed to prevent blood clotting. The International Warfarin
Pharmacogenetics Consortium (IWPC) has built a statistical
model to predict personalized warfarin dose [30]. The IWPC
model requires several types of patient data, including genetic
markers, clinical history, and demographics. Remarkably, the
IWPC model outperforms current standard clinical approaches,
which rely on fixed-dose prescriptions. However, a practitioner
requires all patients to disclose their complete information
to predict treatments. For instance, a patient not filling out a
particular medication intake status through a medical history
form can not get precise treatment.
The previous example illustrates one main shortcoming of
current statistical healthcare models: all patients must provide
all of their data, or prediction of treatment is impossible with
patients withholding their sensitive data [48]. To amend this
problem, data imputation is often applied in healthcare for “fill-
ing the missing” data using the information provided by public
(available) data [47]. However, imputation incurs cumbersome
endeavor: in warfarin example, imputing medical history of
patients is more complicated than predicting the warfarin dose.
This may incur biased estimates under many sensitive data if the
relationship between missing and available data is intricate [42].
More importantly, imputation is impossible if the missing data
is statistically independent of the available data [10].
Therefore, data-driven healthcare is in need for a general
purpose solution to the problem of making treatments with
privacy concerns of patients. We propose one solution to this
problem, named privacy distillation.
Privacy Distillation- Privacy distillation addresses the privacy
concerns of patients for the data used in healthcare statistical
models. We define patient data that compose features from
genetic and clinical data. Genetic data include genes or DNA
sequences with a known location on a chromosome that its
variability plays a major role in treatments. Clinical data
includes inputs from medication history, psychological profiles,
dietary habits, sexual preferences, demographics, and so on.
1We note that information withholding that we address in this paper and
obscuring (patients lying about their sensitive information) are two different
critical problems identified in healthcare. We are currently working on obscurity
problem which is algorithmically and conceptually more complex, as it is
strictly harder than the withholding problem.
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Fig. 1: Privacy distillation scheme: The distilled model f (x3,x4) preserves the privacy of patients at treatment, since it only requires access to
their non-redacted data (x3,x4). However, the distilled model was trained to imitate the predictions of a full model f (x1,x2,x3,x4), which
had access to the redacted data (x1,x2) of other patients and clinical studies. Through this transference of knowledge, the distilled model
provides with more accurate treatments than models using only the non-redacted data (x3,x4) and treatments y´ are nearly as accurate as
models assuming access to the complete patient data (x1,x2,x3,x4).
The intuition behind using both types of data is that they are
useful for facilitating predictions of the correct treatments. In
this setting, we define redacted features as those that patients
withhold due to privacy concerns.
Privacy distillation works as follows (see Figure 1): At
training time, privacy distillation creates a novel model that
retains the accuracy in the absence of redacted features. This
is achieved by improving the model training by transferring
knowledge from redacted features available across other
patients and clinical studies ( a ). At test time, a patient
is asked to provide a set of clinical and genetic features
for medical treatment through doctor-patient communication,
surveys and so on ( b ). The patient chooses to redact features
she deems privacy-sensitive ( c ). The redacted features of a
patient are matched with a precomputed patient profile that
defines different patient disclosure behaviors among patients,
and corresponding distilled model then makes the predictions
on non-redacted features ( d ). If a patient desires a profile
that has not been precomputed, we adapt two solutions (see
Section III-A). The goal of this effort is to develop an algorithm
such that the accuracy under the redacted patient data is
sufficiently close to that of complete data, and any errors
in the model should not induce severe medical side effects.
We highlight that our approach is a generalizable solution, we
here focus its application to personalized medicine.
In this paper, we implement privacy distillation using a
deep neural network (DNN) and evaluate its effectiveness in
the problem of warfarin dose prediction. We compare privacy
distillation with two baselines. The first baseline is partially-
redacted, a model built on public (non-redacted) features. The
second baseline is the non-redacted, which is the current state-
of-the-art linear model trained on complete (redacted and
non-redacted) patient data. We evaluate privacy distillation
by studying the trade-off between the amount of information
disclosed by patients and dose accuracy; then we analyze dose
errors introducing health-related risks. In this, we make the
following contributions:
• We introduce privacy distillation, a mechanism, that allows
patients to control their sensitive information used in health-
care statistical models. Privacy distillation offers an accuracy
similar to the non-redacted model across various patient
profiles; it increases the error of the non-redacted model
by only 3% and outperforms the accuracy of the partially-
redacted model by 13.4%.
• We show that accuracy loss in healthcare models leads
to medical side effects. In the case of warfarin dose
predictions, errors cause stroke, embolism, internal bleeding,
and even mortality. Privacy distillation provides personalized
treatments that are within safety window of a state-of-the-art
linear model for 96.1% of the patients; whereas partially-
redacted models lead to 83.2%.
• We improve the accuracy of the current state-of-the-art
warfarin dose linear model by 2.7% with the use of deep
neural networks.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the essentials of predictive models necessary
to understand healthcare statistical models. We then provide
an overview of generalized distillation which our privacy
distillation mechanism builds on.
A. Healthcare Statistical Models
Statistical models are functions f : X → Y that aim at
predicting targets y∈Y given some explanatory features x∈X .
In the following, we consider real-valued targets y ∈ R and
real vector-valued features x ∈ Rd . Statistical models are built
using a dataset containing pairs of features and targets, denoted
by D = {(xi,yi)}ni=1, and a loss function ` : Y ×Y → [0,∞).
The loss function penalizes deviations between true targets and
predictions. Learning is then searching for the statistical model
f minimizing the average loss:
L(D, f ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
`( f (xi),yi). (1)
For instance, in simple linear least-squares regression, the
statistical model is linear, i.e. f (x) = α>x+β, and the loss
function is the squared loss `( f (x),y) = ( f (x)− y)2. However,
to model complex nonlinear relationships between features and
targets, we will not be using linear statistical models, but deep
neural networks (DNN) [37].
In the domain of healthcare, the applications of statisti-
cal models are skyrocketing: examples include personalized
medicine prescriptions, online crowdsourcing healthcare, dis-
ease risk tests, and personality trait tests. In these applications,
the features x often correspond to different features describing
a patient (medical history, race, weight, etc.), and targets y
correspond to a quantity of interest to improve the patient
health (optimal dosage of a particular drug, recovery time,
depression level, etc.).
When deploying a statistical model in healthcare applications,
there are three well-defined stages: i) data collection, ii) feature
selection, and iii) model learning. First, data collection refers to
the process of gathering relevant diagnostic data from patients,
into a dataset of feature-target pairs D = {(xi,yi)}ni=1. Second,
feature selection refers to the process of removing unnecessary
features or attributes from each of the vectors xi. Third, model
learning refers to the process of learning a statistical model f
from the data D . These three processes are repeated as needed
(collecting data, selecting features, learning models) until a
sufficient accuracy is achieved. We call the process of learning
a statistical model training time. We call the process of using
a fully trained statistical model to make predictions test time.
B. Generalized Distillation
Model compression [7] or distillation [24] are techniques
to reduce the size of statistical models. Model distillation
compresses large models flarge by training a small model
fsmall(x) that imitates the predictions of the large model flarge(x).
Remarkably, model distillation is often able to compress models
without incurring any loss in accuracy [24]. Put in math,
distillation assumes that the large model flarge has been learned
by minimizing Equation 1, and proceeds to learn the small
model fsmall by minimizing
(1−λ)L({(xi,yi)}ni=1, fsmall)+λL({xi,si}ni=1, fsmall), (2)
where λ∈ [0,1] is an imitation parameter trading-off how much
does the small model imitate the big model, versus directly
learning the data. In (2), a second dataset is introduced with
targets si = flarge(xi)/T ; these are the softened predictions made
by the large model. Here, T > 0 is a temperature parameter
scaling the predictions of the large model2.
Lopez-Paz et al. recently introduced generalized distillation,
an extension of model distillation used to compress models
built on a set of features into models built on a different set of
features [39]. Generalized distillation is one specific instance
of learning using privileged information [13], [52], [53], a
learning paradigm assuming that some of the features used
to train a statistical model will not be available at test time.
More formally, generalized distillation assumes that a statistical
2The temperature parameter was recently interpreted as a defense mechanism
to adversarial data perturbations [44] and as a mechanism to increase the
detection accuracy of security sensitive applications [11].
model will be trained on some data {(xi,x?i ,yi)}ni=1, and trained
model will be tested on some data {x j}n+mj=n+1. Therefore, the set
of features {x?i }ni=1 is available at training but not at test time.
However, these features may contain important information
that would lead to statistical models of higher accuracy. For
example, consider the case where xi is the image of a biopsy,
yi ∈ {−1,+1} specifies if the tissue shown in the biopsy shows
cancer and x?i is the medical report of an oncologist. It is
reasonable to assume that the medical report x?i contains useful
information to classify biopsy images xi, but such information
will be unavailable at test time.
Generalized distillation [39] tackles the problem of learning
without unavailable data at test time as follows. First, it
trains a model f (x) on the feature-target set {x?i ,yi}ni=1 by
minimizing Equation (1). Second, it trains a second model
f (x) by minimizing Equation (2), where si = flarge(x?i )/T .
Therefore, it allows developing objectives able to incorporate
such sources of information into predictive models, without
requiring them at test time. In the sequel, the features not
available at test time will correspond to undisclosed private
features. Using these features, we will formulate a new variant
of generalized distillation in a regression setting through
patients’ privacy behaviors: we propose to use knowledge
extracted from redacted features of a patient across other
databases and clinical studies to improve model training when
patients redact a different set of privacy-sensitive information.
III. PATIENT-DRIVEN PRIVACY
In the introduction, we stated that patients desire to control
data they wish to expose for use in healthcare statistical models.
Using the language from Section II-A, in order to use a trained
model f (x) for treatment, we must have values for all the entries
comprising the feature vector x. However, in the healthcare
domain, the vectors x often describe different types of patient
data, and some of these entries may refer to genomic and
clinical privacy. Therefore, patients may have different levels
of willingness to disclose such data. We give examples of
disclosure behavior of the patients in Appendix A.
To make predictions under redacted inputs, one may consider
data imputation to fill the blanks with estimated values. Yet,
imputation is impractical because it is either hard to apply
under high dimensional redacted (missing) inputs or impossible
if redacted inputs are statistically independent of the public
(available) inputs. A review of this literature is given in [14].
We now start with technical prerequisites required for
developing a model that supports patient-driven privacy. We
then develop a mechanism for healthcare statistical models
complying with the prerequisites, named privacy distillation.
Patient-driven privacy prerequisites- We outline the charac-
teristics required for a model to implement an effective and
complete patient-driven mechanism:
1) Feature selection- Given a large pool of patient data;
selection of relevant clinical and genomic features is
required for a model to improve the accuracy.
Dataset	Acquisi,on	
Pa#ent	genomic	and	clinical	informa#on	
Feature	Selec,on	
Select	relevant	clinical	features	
Pa,ent	Clustering	
Cluster	pa#ent	profiles	based	on	redac#on	behavior	
Learning	through	Generalized	Dis,lla,on	
Build	a	dis#lled	model	per	pa#ent	profile	
Features	required	for	predic#ons	
A	pa#ent	redacts	some	features	
Match	with	a	precomputed	pa#ent	profile	
Make	predic#ons	
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dis#lled	model	
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Fig. 2: Privacy distillation process: (Left) how to learn distilled models based on redaction behaviors, (Right) how to use the distilled model
to predict personalized treatments for new patients.
2) Control over type and amount of features- The model should
consider patients’ desire to redact information that is deemed
privacy-sensitive.
3) Disclosure behavior of patients- Understanding the disclo-
sure behavior of patients on redacted features is necessary
to build efficient models.
4) Maintaining accuracy- The model under sufficient redacted
features should retain the accuracy as almost as good as
having complete patient data.
5) Patient safety- The prediction errors should not introduce
any serious health-related risks.
The rest of this section describes how we address these
characteristics with privacy distillation.
A. Privacy Distillation
Privacy distillation is a mechanism to build healthcare
statistical models that allow patients to define their own non-
redacted and redacted features while providing them with safe
and accurate personalized treatments. It comprises two main
stages (see Figure 2). The first stage trains a statistical model
that includes four steps: data acquisition, feature selection,
patient clustering and learning via generalized distillation
(Section III-A1). The second stage addresses how to use the
distilled model to predict personalized treatments for new
patients. It includes two steps: assigning patients to a profile
and making predictions (Section III-A2).
Motivating Example- We introduce the privacy distillation
through a simple example. Suppose we wish to treat a patient
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with a
patient profile “no sexual assault features”. A patient profile
describes a set of patients providing all their features except
their background about sexual assault. Privacy distillation
proceeds as follows. As a first step, privacy distillation defines
a set of patient profiles. Each patient profile describes a
different privacy behavior. In the following, let us denote all the
patient features by (x1,x2,x3,x4), and (x1,x2) the sexual assault
features. Thus, the patient profile “no sexual assault features”
considers the features (x1,x2) as redacted, and the features
(x3,x4) as non-redacted. Once defined, privacy distillation
builds a model for each patient profile. First, privacy distillation
builds a model yˆ = f (x1,x2,x3,x4) that uses all the features
available across other patients and clinical studies to estimate
the personalized treatment yˆ. In particular, this model is built to
predict the true clinical treatments y available in some database.
Second, privacy distillation builds a model y˜ = f (x3,x4), this
time only on non-redacted features. However, the model
y˜ = f (x3,x4) is built to learn the true clinical treatments y
available in our database, as well as to imitate the treatments
yˆ = f (x1,x2,x3,x4) predicted by the model that uses all the
features. Finally, when a new patient belonging to the “no
sexual assault features” profile comes for treatment, we can
use the model y˜= f (x3,x4) to provide a personalized treatment,
while preserving the desired level of privacy.
1) Training Distilled Models: This section presents the four
steps of training distilled models: data acquisition, feature
selection, patient clustering and learning distilled models.
Data Acquisition- We collect a set of feature-target pairs
D = {(xi,yi)}ni=1, where xi ∈Rd is a vector of d features (both
clinical and genetic) describing the i-th patient, and yi ∈ R is
the target defined for a patient. In our experiments, we use real
data collected on patients prescribed to warfarin from multiple
medical institutions (see Section IV-B).
Feature selection- The raw patient data D may include
multiple irrelevant features by means of questionnaires, health
history, lifestyle choices, etc.. These irrelevant features contain
no information about the problem of interest, and make
the analysis more complicated due to the curses of high-
dimensional data [29]. To alleviate this issue, we preprocess
the raw data D by discarding those features irrelevant to the
problem. In particular, we use Backward Attribute Elimination
(BAE) [35], [38] algorithm which is found in previous studies
to be highly effective in the dataset we use. The BAE algorithm
starts by building d − 1 statistical models, where the i-th
statistical model is built using all the features except the i-th
one, for all i = 1, . . . ,d. Next, the BAE algorithm chooses the
model with the highest accuracy and decides that the feature
that was excluded from that model is irrelevant to the problem.
The BAE algorithm proceeds then to build d− 2 statistical
models, in search for the next irrelevant feature. This process
is repeated while the desired prediction accuracy is retained.
We perform BAE on clinical features since genetic features are
often verified by experts. In the following, we denote by D
the dataset obtained after data collection and feature selection.
Patient Clustering- We cluster our data D into K different
patient profiles. Each patient profile describes a different
disclosure behavior: what features are understood as public,
and what features are understood as privacy-sensitive. The
patient profiles are decided by analyzing the different disclosing
behavior patterns found in the dataset. The k-th patient profile
is a subset of D is defined as follows:
Dk = {(xki ,xk,∗i ,yki )}ni=1.
In the previous, the vector (xki ,x
k,∗
i ,y
k
i ) contains the features of
the i-th patient from the k-th patient profile. More specifically,
xki are non-redacted features, x
k,∗
i are redacted features, and y
k
i
are targets. We note that we find the disclosure behavior of
users by examining the dataset. However, this process can be
generalized to a user study to collect their privacy behaviors.
This might allow better identification of disclosure behavior
of patients; thus the number precomputed patient profiles. We
defer conducting a user study to future work.
Learning Distilled Models- We now introduce learning dis-
tilled models, which is a technique we propose that improves
model training under redacted features. Distilled models are
adapted from generalized distillation procedure introduced in
Section II-B, to suit our goal of improving model accuracy in
the face of patients redacting private features.
Our intuition is that not all patients redact the same data;
thus, non-redacted data can be acquired from other patients or
controlled clinical studies. This is verified through analysis of
patient data collected from multiple databases in Section IV-B.
Therefore, we transfer the knowledge acquired from non-
redacted data of other patients when a patient redacts data.
We tackle the problem of learning with redacted information
as follows. First, we train a privileged model fpriv(x) on
the feature-target set {x?i ,yi}ni=1. Second, we train a distilled
model fdist(x). More precisely, given patient profiles, we build
one model per patient profile, to obtain K distilled statistical
models f 1, . . . , f K . The objective of the k-th distilled model is
minimized as follows:
predict data︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−λ)L({(xki ,yi)}ni=1, f k)+
imitate private model︷ ︸︸ ︷
λL({xki , f k,∗(xk,∗i )}ni=1, f k), (3)
where the model f k,∗ is learned on the set {(xk,∗i ,yki )}nki=1.
This, we call f k,∗ a privileged model, since it had access to the
redacted features at training time. Therefore, the distilled model
learns by simultaneously imitating the privileged predictions of
the privileged model and learning the targets of the original data.
The objective is independent of the learning algorithm; thus it
can be minimized using arbitrary models (see Section V).
Generalized distillation may have a major problem when
used for regression. This is because of the objective for-
mulation through a temperature parameter: L( f (xi),yi) +
λL( f (xi), f (x∗i)/T ). Consider a temperature parameter for T
= 50, this would be L( f (xi),yi)+λL( f (xi), f (x∗)/50) which
is almost equal to: L( f (xi),yi)+λL( f (xi),0). Using the mean
square error, the error is computed: ( f (xi)−yi)2+λ f (xi)2. That
is, it penalizes the large predictions, and drives predictions to
zero; thus the use of temperature parameter may increase the
error of the distilled model while treating patients (i.e., underes-
timates the predictions). Therefore, we formulate the objective 3
with use of imitation parameter λ in contrast to having both
imitation and temperature parameters.
In our formulation, the imitation parameter λ controls
the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. For λ ≈ 0, the
objective (3) approaches the previously introduced standard
objective (1) (Section II-A), which amounts to learning a
model f k solely on non-redacted features. However, as λ→ 1,
the objective (3) transfers the knowledge acquired by the
privileged model f ∗,k into the model f k. The intuition is that
whenever privileged model f k,∗ makes a prediction error at
patient xki , the model f
k should forget about getting that patient
right, and focus on the rest of patients in that patient profile.
These teachings from the privileged model do, in many cases,
significantly help learning process of f k.
To conclude, we balance the privacy and accuracy by using
redacted features provided by external patients (i.e., not in that
profile) when learning the model but ignoring such features
when providing treatment to the patients. This is achieved
by complementing the training of the model by allowing the
transference of knowledge about redacted attributes across
patients and clinical studies. As a consequence, models trained
with privacy distillation do not require all data from patients
and aims to retain the accuracy under redacted features close
to that of complete features.
2) Using Distilled Models for Treatment: At test time, a
new patient x0 decides what features to disclose, and what
features to redact. We then assign the patient x0 to the profile
k that maximally overlaps with respect to which features are
disclosed (non-redacted features). Then, the distilled model f k
associated with that profile is used to make a prediction.
If none of the K patient profiles properly describes the
disclosure behavior of the patient x0, we can adopt one out
of two solutions to maximize the accuracy of her treatment.
First, we can build a new patient profile Dk+1 and statistical
model f k+1 which mimics the disclosure behavior of the new
patient. This solution would translate into a small computational
overhead3 at test time. Second, we can find an already built
profile which discloses every feature that the new patient
discloses, but is more conservative about other features. This
solution would translate into a potential loss of accuracy since
not all of the disclosed features by the new patient would be
used for treatment at test time.
3In our experiments; we train 5K patient samples with 65 features on 2.6GHz
2-core Intel i5 processor with 8GB RAM less than one minute including optimal
parameter search.
Attribute Patient sample
Demographic
Race Black, Black or African American
Ethnicity Both not Hispanic or Latino
Age 50 - 59 (binned age in years)
Gender male
Background (clinical history)
Height (cm) 161.29
Weight (kg) 86.1
Comorbidities
no cardiomyopathy,
no hyperlipidemia,
no hypertension
Medications
not aspirin,
not simvastatin,
...
Macrolide antibiotics Yes
Valve Replacement No
Diabetes Not present
Herbal medications, Yesvitamins, supplements
Genotypic
Cyp2C9 genotypes *3
VKORC1 SNP rs9923231 A/G
Phenotypic
Current Smoker Yes
TABLE I: Data used for personalized warfarin dose prediction.
IV. EVALUATION
We now evaluate privacy distillation at the problem of
warfarin dosing; wherein data is collected from a broad patient
population to determine the proper personalized dose. We
start with basic clinical information essential to understanding
warfarin, as well as review the current state-of-the-art models
used to predict its personalized dosage (Section IV-A). We then
describe experimental setup, including the data acquisition,
the selection of features, the definition of patient profiles,
the baseline models against which we will compare, and
the evaluation metrics that we care about (Section IV-B).
We evaluate the performance of privacy distillation on the
tension between privacy and dose predictions under various
patient profiles (Section IV-C). Finally, we explore the tension
between privacy and more tangible utility of patient health
safety (Section IV-D). Our key findings are as follows:
• Privacy distillation provides only 3% less accurate person-
alized treatments than the state-of-the-art linear model that
have access to the complete patient data, and 13.4% more
accurate than the models that ignore privacy-sensitive data.
• A loss in dose accuracy in healthcare models introduces
over-and under-prescriptions that lead to stroke, embolism,
and bleeding. Privacy distillation increases the under- and
over-prescriptions by 3.9% of the patients over the state-of-
the-art linear model, whereas models constructed without
patients’ sensitive features (i.e., public features) lead to
16.8% of the patients.
• By using deep neural networks, we improve the accuracy
of the state-of-the-art model by 2.7%.
A. Warfarin Dose Algorithm
Warfarin, known by the brand name Coumadin, is a widely
prescribed (over 20 million times each year in the United
States) oral anticoagulant used to prevent blood clots from
.	.	.	
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Fig. 3: Privacy distillation process for privacy behaviors observed in
multiple dataset.
forming mostly in the heart and lungs. Unfortunately, wrong
dosages of warfarin may lead to serious and even fatal adverse
consequences. On the one hand, under-prescriptions of warfarin
will render the treatment useless. On the other hand, over-
prescriptions of warfarin may cause hemorrhagic strokes and
major bleeding [1]. Current practice suggests fixing the initial
dose to 5 or 10 milligrams per day [49]. Then, patients
undertake regular blood tests to measure how long it takes
for blood clots to form. This measure is referred to as the
International Normalized Ratio (INR). The subsequent warfarin
dosages are then designed to keep the patient’s INR constant
and within the desired levels.
The International Warfarin Pharmacogenetics Consortium
(IWPC) performed a study on a large and diverse patient pop-
ulation prescribed to warfarin, for the purpose of determining
rules for an accurate personalized warfarin dosage [30]. The
study concluded one of the largest and most comprehensive
datasets to date for evaluating personalized warfarin. A long
line of work culminated on a linear pharmacogenetic model that
outperformed all previous approaches to personalized warfarin
dosage prediction4. The model combines genotypic, demo-
graphic, phenotypic, and background patient information [30],
[31], [46]. The genotypic information concerns genes VKORC1
and CYP2C9. While the VKORC1 gene encodes the target
enzyme of warfarin (vitamin K), the CYP2C9 gene has an
effect on warfarin metabolization [18]. The demographic and
phenotypic information concern various patient characteristics
and habits, such as their smoking status. The background
information involves the clinical history of a patient, including
medications that may interfere their INR. All of this information
highlights the variability across patients; thus the necessity of
personalized treatment [46].
B. Experimental Setup
In the following, we describe the steps used to set up our
experiment for warfarin dose prediction. This section parallels
the steps described in Section III.
Data Acquisition- We use previously introduced IWPC
dataset [30]. The dataset is collected from 21 medical organiza-
tions from nine countries and four continents. They are located
in Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Israel, Brazil,
United Kingdom, and the United States. The data collection
4The algorithm has been given to doctors and other clinicians for predicting
ideal dose of warfarin.
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Fig. 4: An exploration of the features categories and ranking of the
each feature. (Refer to the text for feature definitions.)
from multiple sources allows to analyze the privacy behavior of
patients and to use the non-redacted features in model training
required for privacy distillation. For instance, when a patient
redacts a set of features, these features are found out to be
non-redacted in the dataset of other organizations. This process
is illustrated in Figure 3 and explained throughout this section.
The dataset includes clinical and genotypic data of patients.
Table I presents an example of features collected from a
patient. We split the clinical data into three categories of
six demographic, 24 background, one phenotypic feature. We
represent two genotypic features with genetic variants of
CYP2C9 as combinations of *1, *2, *3 and VKOCR1 with
single-nucleotide rs9923231 of G/G, A/G or A/A genotypes.
We split the data into two cohorts; the training cohort is
used to define patient profiles and to learn the distilled models,
and the validation cohort is used to evaluate the accuracy of
the distilled models and the errors introducing health-related
risks. We convert the categorical variables into numeric factors
and standardize features by removing the mean and scaling to
unit variance. Overall, the cohorts used in experiments consist
of 1221 training and 656 validation samples in which each
patient is described by 33 features of four categories, and has
warfarin dose as a target.
Feature Selection- We apply BFE algorithm using least-
squares regression (as in reference paper [30]) to infer the
relevant features for warfarin dosing. We illustrate the 33
selected features and their categories in Figure 4. The x-axis
shows the feature numbers of each category and y-axis is
the name of these categories. The most relevant features are
numbered in circles and found to be the primary predictors:
Demographic feature of 4 race; genotypic features of 2
Cyp2C9 and 3 VKORC1; background features of 1 weight,
5 use of rifampicin (an antibiotic to treat or prevent a several
types of bacterial infections), 6 medications (list of medicines
taken), and 7 use of Cordarone (used for treatment of irregular
heartbeats), and phenotypic feature of 8 current smoker status.
Patient Profiles- We define three patient profiles based on
what information patients disclose, with respect to the four
categories of demographic, background, phenotypic, and geno-
typic information (see Table II). First, public patients disclose
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Public patient Pharmacogenetic algorithm 3 3 3 3
With all except demographic 7 3 3 3
Closed With all except background 3 7 3 3
patient With all except phenotypic 3 3 7 3
With all except genotypic 3 3 3 7
Demographic except others 3 7 7 7
Strict Background except others 7 3 7 7
patient Phenotypic except others 7 7 3 7
Genotypic except others 7 7 7 3
TABLE II: Patient profiles used in experiments.
the information relating to the four categories. Second, closed
patients disclose the information relating to three out of the
four categories. Third, strict patients disclose the information
relating to only one out of the four categories. For instance,
a closed patient refers to “with all except genotypic” does
not expose genotypic features of VKORC1 and CYP2C9, yet
discloses the others, and a strict patient refers to “genotypic
except others” exposes genotypic features, but nothing else.
Privacy Distillation Implementation- We implement privacy
distillation using a deep neural network (DNN) with a hidden
layer of 32 rectified linear units each, using the Keras libary [15]
running the Theano backend [8]. We use the Adam optimizer
to minimize mean squared error loss function [34]. This setup
performance is consistent with more complex architectures
that have evaluated with the warfarin dataset and allows us
to implement network training as well as the distilled models
efficiently. In our experiments, we show the results of privacy
distillation with an imitation parameter values of λ ∈ [0,1].
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Fig. 5: Warfarin dose prediction performance measured against linear
pharmacogenetic and deep neural network models on a subset of
dataset. (Strict patient profiles are similar to closed patient profiles.)
Evaluation Metrics- We evaluate the accuracy of models using
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Mean Absolute Percentage
Error (MAPE). These metrics are easily interpreted statistics
which is a measure of how far predicted values are away from
clinically-deduced warfarin dose and accuracy as a percentage
of the error. They are widely used in prediction of real-valued
outputs in medical treatments [30]. The lower values of MAE,
the closer estimates to the actual dose, indicate better quality of
treatment. For each experiment, we report the warfarin dosage
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Fig. 6: Comparison of privacy distillation with non-redacted and partially-redacted models. Std. dev. of ten runs falls in on average ±1.7 (see
Section IV-D for medical consequences of models to make dosing decisions).
MAE and MAPE when averaged over ten random training-
validation cohort splits.
Models for Comparison- We evaluate the accuracy of privacy
distillation under the patient profiles against two baselines:
Partially-redacted, which is a model trained only on the
information disclosed by the patients, and non-redacted model
is trained on the complete patient data. To build a non-redacted
model, we reimplement the pharmacogenetic algorithm in
Python by direct translation from the authors’ implementa-
tion [30]. Furthermore, we implement a deep neural network
model with the same architecture used in privacy distillation.
We find that DNN model gives on average 2.7% more accurate
dose predictions than the current non-redacted linear model. We
go on and compare the model performance on partially-redacted
models; similar improvements hold both for closed and strict
patient profiles (see Figure 5). To make fair comparisons, we
use DNNs to implement the three models: privacy distillation,
partially-redacted and non-redacted.
C. Results on Dose Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of privacy distillation against
partially-redacted (dashed line), non-redacted linear pharma-
cogenetic algorithm (dotted line), and non-redacted model of
DNN (dashed-dotted line). All experiments are performed on
previously described patient profiles. Table III summarizes the
average results of errors and Figure 6 presents the MAE of
privacy distillation with an imitation parameter λ ∈ [0,1].
Non-redacted model
MAE MAPE (%)
Public Pharmacogenetic algorithm 11.2 39.3
patient Our implementation (DNN) 10.9 36.6
Partially-redacted (DNN) Distilled (DNN)
MAE MAPE (%) MAE MAPE (%)
With all except demographic 13.3 44.6 11.4 39.7
Closed With all except background 11.0 37.1 11.0 37.0
patient With all except phenotypic 14.8 50.4 12.3 43.5
With all except genotypic 16.3 56.5 13.5 46.8
Demographic except others 12.2 41.8 12.0 40.8
Strict Background except others 14.3 49.1 13.3 45.5
patient Phenotypic except others 13.3 48.5 13.3 48.5
Genotypic except others 11.1 37.3 10.9 36.6
TABLE III: Prediction performance of models for warfarin dose under
patient profiles. We note that partially redacted models implemented
with pharmacogenetic algorithm performs on average 13.4% worse
than privacy distillation.
We first evaluate the effectiveness of privacy distillation on
closed patient profiles. As shown in Figure 6(a-d), privacy
distillation with a carefully chosen λ outperforms the partially-
redacted model, and achieves a similar accuracy to the non-
redacted model. For instance, illustrated in Figure 6(a), “with
all except demographic” is a profile in which a patient does
not disclose her demographic features. Assume for now that
warfarin dose prediction is possible only using non-redacted
features of patients by using the partially-redacted model at
test time. The error yields MAE of 13.3; However, if a patient
provides complete data, the error yields 10.9. This indicates 8%
less accurate dose predictions than the non-redacted model. As
we detail in Section IV-D, this difference significantly increases
various medical side effects.
Now, we make warfarin dose predictions by distilled models.
Returning to Figure 6(a), when a patient redacts the demo-
graphic information, the distilled model yields MAE of 11.4.
This is exactly 3.1% mean absolute error less than the non-
redacted model compared to 8% of the partially-redacted model.
As seen in Figure 6(b-c), the results of other closed patient
profiles are similar, and both retain dose errors similar to
the non-redacted model, and always better than the partially-
redacted model. It is important to note that the impact of
using models implemented with DNN over linear models
is significant. As shown in Figure 6(b), a patient with only
partially-redacted features gives better results than the original
linear method with all features. In addition, we find that when
a patient does not disclose genotypic features, the increase in
distilled model errors is more observable than other patient
profiles (Figure 6(d)) as these features are the key variables
for warfarin dose predictions (see Section III-A1).
A similar analysis on the strict patient profiles confirms
the tensions between accuracy and the amount of information
disclosed by patients (Figure 6(e-h)). The benefit of distilled
models similar to the closed patient profiles. However, we
make two additional important remarks here. First, patients
within the “phenotypic except other” would solely disclose
their “smoking status”. This results in a very simplistic model
with limited information, and yields higher errors than other
patient profiles (Figure 6(g)). Second, the importance of
genotypic features becomes more apparent when using deep
neural networks, instead of the original linear pharmacogenetic
algorithm (Figure 6(h)). That is, the genetic information of
patients better generalizes the nonlinear DNN distilled model
with the patients used in our experiments and assigns slightly
better dosages than the non-redacted model at λ=0.1.
Overall, the benefit of privacy-distillation is consistent across
all patient profiles. On average, privacy-distillation offers
dose predictions 5.7% and 3.9% less accurate than those
provided by the non-redacted DNN and state-of-the-art linear
pharmacogenetic model. However, it is necessary to study the
impact of errors introducing health risks as we discuss next.
D. Results on Patient Health
In this section, we ask the essential question: Does making
dose predictions with privacy distillation introduce health-
related risks? To answer this question, we present a study
to evaluate the clinical relevance of dose errors when patients
redact features. The study aims at analyzing the dose errors
that are inside and outside of the warfarin safety window, and
the medical side effects of under- or over prescriptions.
Overview- We design a study to validate the clinical value
of privacy distillation on warfarin dose. The study aims at
evaluating the dose errors of partially-redacted, non-redacted
models and privacy distillation. We consider weekly dosage
errors for each patient because using weekly values eliminates
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Fig. 7: Overview of study designed to evaluate the clinical value
of privacy distillation. Details of clinical relevance and definition of
safety window are given Section IV-D1.
the errors posed by the initial (daily) dose. For instance, a
small initial dose error may incur more health risks over
time (see discussion for details). We follow the design of
the clinical relevance implemented in [30] which is to date
the largest completed warfarin analysis. The authors assess
the pharmacogenetic algorithm over clinical and fixed-dose
algorithms, yet we measure the model efficacy on making dose
predictions. We define two arms to get the weekly dosages:
1) Pharmacogenetic: Use of a DNN implementation of the
pharmacogenetic algorithm with complete patient data.
2) Private: Use of privacy distillation and partially-redacted
models. These models are identical to the pharmacogenetic
arm; however, we only replace the pharmacogenetic algo-
rithm with privacy distillation and partially-redacted model
under different patient profiles.
Recall that pharmacogenetic algorithm (non-redacted model)
is the current best-known algorithm for initial dose prediction
over clinical and fixed-dose approach.
1) Patient Safety: To evaluate the impact of errors that
introduce health-related risks, we draw patient samples from
validation cohort and assign them weekly warfarin dosages with
the use of pharmacogenetic and privacy arms (see Figure 7).
We then measure the errors between the estimated dose and
clinically-deduced ground truths. These errors define how good
arms are on the prediction of dosage for a particular patient.
The direction of the error comes with a positive or negative
sign that points out the under or over-prescribes. We use this
value for finding the side effects as detailed next.
Safety window- We calculate the percentage of patients whose
predicted dose of warfarin is within a therapeutic safety window.
The weekly dose is accepted in the safety window if an
estimated dose falls within 20% of its corresponding clinically-
deduced ground truth. This is because the value defines the
difference of 1 mg per day relative to the fixed starting dose of
Non-redacted model Legend
U (%) SW (%) O (%) U: Underestimation
Public Pharmacogenetic algorithm 21.8 40.95 37.3 SW: Safety Window
patient Our implementation (DNN) 24.9 42.3 33.8 O: Overestimation
Partially-redacted model (DNN) Privacy distillation (DNN)
U (%) SW (%) O (%) U (%) SW (%) O (%)
With all except demographic 28.2 36.1 35.7 22.8 40.4 36.8
Closed With all except background 23.5 42.0 34.5 23.4 42.3 34.3
patient With all except phenotypic 30.9 33.0 36.1 23.3 36.5 40.2
With all except genotypic 31.3 30.1 38.6 27.7 33.2 39.1
Demographic except others 24.0 37.4 38.6 25.1 37.8 37.1
Strict Background except others 28.9 32.4 38.7 27.5 34.6 37.9
patient Phenotypic except others 26.8 31.0 42.2 26.2 31.7 42.1
Genotypic except others 20.5 39.2 40.3 20.1 39.8 40.1
TABLE IV: Percentage of patients in validation cohort that are within the safety window, underestimated or overestimated against weekly
dosages of clinically-deduced dosages. Std. dev. of ten independent runs falls in on average ±2.5. Partially redacted models implemented
with pharmacogenetic algorithm perform on average 24.1% of the patients in the safety window.
5 mg per day which is often accepted as clinically relevant [30],
[33]. The deviations of both directions fall outside of the safety
window. Specifically, any dose prediction is an overestimation
that is at least 20% higher than the actual dose and is an
underestimation that is at least 20% lower than the actual dose.
Health risks- To identify the side effects of warfarin, we follow
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warfarin medical
guide for the most common side effects of overestimation and
underestimation [20]. Taking high-dose warfarin causes INR
to be high (thin blood) which causes higher risks of having
intracranial and extracranial bleeding. Taking low doses causes
INR to be low (thick blood), and warfarin does not protect
patients from developing a blood clot, and it causes embolism
and stroke. In both cases, extremely high or low doses may
lead to death. We note that certain amount of dosing errors,
in reality, do not immediately cause these adverse effects, as
factors such as commonly used medications and foods with
vitamin K also play a role in blood clotting.
2) Clinical Relevance: We now evaluate the health-related
risks of making dose decisions under patient profiles with
partially-redacted, non-redacted and privacy distillation models.
Table IV shows the percentage of patients within the dose
safety window, under-prescriptions, and over-prescriptions.
Remarkably, privacy-distillation yields nearly-optimal weekly
dose errors, when compared to non-redacted DNN implemen-
tation of a pharmacogenetic algorithm that assumes access
to complete patient information. It yields on average 5.3%
fewer patients in the safety window. For instance, “with all
except demographic” closed patient profile gives 22.8% under-
prescribes, 40.4% in the safety window and 36.8% over-
prescribes. This value is only 1.9% less than the non-redacted
model and 4.3% more than the results of the partially-redacted
model. It is interesting to report that the direction of the error
changes. The percentage of overestimated patients is increased
from 33.8% to 36.8% and underestimated patients is decreased
from 24.9% to 22.8%.
Analyzing the results more in detail, we find that some
patient profiles yield a lower percentage of patients in the safety
window compared to other profiles. “With all except genotypic”
and “Phenotypic except others” patient profiles yield 33.2%
and 31.7% of the patients in the safety window compared to
the 42.3% of public patients. As discussed in Section IV-C,
the high amount of information disclosed by patients such
as using only phenotypic feature or disclosure of important
variables such as genotypic features causes loss of information
in model learning. Thus, over- and under-prescriptions become
more apparent than other patient profiles. However, privacy
distillation always performs better treatments than those of
partially-redacted models.
To conclude, privacy distillation gives nearly optimal dosage
error across all patient profiles. It offers 5.3% and 3.9% fewer
patients in the safety window than those provided by the
non-redacted DNN and state-of-the-art linear pharmacogenetic
model. In turn, it is effective at preventing errors that introduce
health-related risks.
V. DISCUSSION
We presented privacy distillation in a regression setting.
However, its objective can be formulated to other statistical
models such as supervised, semi-supervised, transfer and
universum learning [39]. In these, two important factors need
to be addressed to maximize the accuracy: Model selection and
parameter tuning. For the former, the objective function can
be minimized using arbitrary models, as privacy distillation is
a model free mechanism. For the latter, while minimizing the
objective, the imitation parameter λ should be chosen carefully
for finding the optimal distilled model.
It is important to note that our study on predicting warfarin
dosages makes the evaluation of privacy distillation different
than those solely based on raw accuracy. However, there exist
more comprehensive studies such as clinical trials to evaluate
5Note: We remark that our results are similar to those found in reference
paper [30]. These results represent the current best-known pharmacogenetic
method for predicting initial warfarin dose, and often gives more accurate
dose prescriptions than current clinical practices as difficulty in establishing
an initial dose of warfarin varies by a factor of 10 among patients [30], [32].
long-term health risks. For instance, it is common to observe
warfarin dose by subsequently titrating to 90 days by using
pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamics (PK/PD) models, as dose
titration after one-week period may change the dosages and
pose varying health risks [3]. However, long-term studies
require observation of INR responses because INR levels are
not stable during this period.
The other crucial point for an evaluation of errors is the
models for risk estimation. There exist advanced models to
estimate an adverse event occurring in a specific period or
as a result of a specific situation. For instance, varying INR
levels of a patient can be used to estimate the correlation
between stroke and bleeding event [50]. These models define
more detailed health risks through various measures of the
blood clot. However, the input/output of the model components
interacts with detailed clinical patient information for precise
estimation. Privacy distillation can be easily integrated with
more exhaustive clinical trials under these models.
VI. RELATED WORK
Privacy-sensitive Information- Clarke have categorized the
types of privacy and outlined specific protections [16]. The
categories include the privacy of the person, privacy of
personal behavior, the privacy of personal data, and privacy of
personal communication. Pertaining to these categories, recent
studies have analyzed the individuals’ behavior of information
disclosure both in online and offline contexts[4], [41]. The
common point of the studies is individuals’ context-dependent
preferences and the subjectivity on the personal matters. We
solve these problems with one of our implementation goal of
making predictions available under varying number of redacted
inputs of patients (i.e., patient profiles).
The Law and Medical Privacy- The goal of medical privacy is
keeping information about a patient confidential. This involves
both conversational discretion and medical record security. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
privacy and security rules [25], [45] is the baseline law that
protects patient medical information. There are also recent laws
dealing with genetic information privacy [28]. The goal of these
regulations is to establish the rights individuals have concerning
their health information. Privacy distillation formalizes this
goal and addresses the patient control over privacy-sensitive
information under these regulations.
Healthcare Statistical Models- In recent years, researchers
have extensively investigated healthcare models. Futoma et al.
used random forests and DNNs for predicting early hospital
readmissions [23]. Volm et al. developed in vitro tests to predict
tumors’ drug responsiveness for cancer treatment [54]. Other
researchers in pharmacogenomics predicted the dose of the
medicines and their responses on patients [6], [9]. These models
can be equipped with privacy distillation when a set of features
is identified as privacy-sensitive. In addition, privacy distillation
handles all stages of modeling, including feature selection and
redaction behavior of patients.
Privacy Threats to Patient Information- Privacy threats
target obtaining sensitive patient information from models or
databases. Homer et al. used the public allele frequencies to
infer the possibility of the participation of an individual in a
genotype database [27]. Wang et al. showed that statistics on
genetics and diseases could be used to identify individuals [55].
Fredrikson et. al. introduced a model inversion attack and
used same warfarin dataset to predict a patient’s genetic
markers from some clinical data and warfarin dosages [22].
These approaches consider different utility/privacy metrics,
as they assume that patients disclose all of their information
and attempt to infer sensitive information by studying the
relationships between inputs and outputs of the model.
Defense of Privacy Leaks- As a response to the privacy
threats, researchers suggest prevention and remedies to such
breaches [12], [17], [40]. These approaches are limited to
protecting the privacy of users on inputs required for training
or classification. We view our efforts in this paper to be
complementary to much these. Privacy distillation can be easily
integrated as a user-driven mechanism to strike a balance
between accuracy and redacted inputs of users.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a patient-driven privacy mechanism named
privacy distillation. It is a learning meta-algorithm to construct
accurate healthcare statistical models that allow patients to con-
trol their privacy-sensitive data. We evaluated the effectiveness
of privacy distillation on pharmacogenetic modeling of person-
alized warfarin dose. In our experiments, privacy distillation
outperformed the state-of-the-art healthcare statistical models
that ignore privacy-sensitive data. By reusing knowledge about
privacy-sensitive information across patients, privacy distillation
showed nearly optimal warfarin prescriptions, competing with
the idealized models that assume access to complete patient
data. We analyzed the impact of the accuracy gains provided by
privacy distillation on patient health; this showed a significant
reduction in warfarin under- and over-prescriptions. Such
accurate predictions can translate into less health-related risks
of embolism, strokes, or bleeding.
This work is the first effort at developing models under
redacted users inputs. The capacity afforded by this approach
will allow us to make accurate predictions in a wide array of
applications requiring private inputs, such as the ones found
in medicine, law, forensics, and social networks. In the future,
we will explore a wide range of environments and evaluate the
ability of privacy distillation to promote its effectiveness.
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APPENDIX
A. Privacy Concerns of Patients
We provide some examples of patients redacting their data
due to the privacy concerns. We refer the reader to Koontz [36]
for a more comprehensive discussion of privacy concerns of
patients and their reasons.
• U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS)
estimated that 2M Americans did not seek treatment for
mental illness [19].
• Millions of young Americans that suffers from sexually
transmitted diseases do not seek treatment [19].
• HHS estimated that 586K Americans did not seek earlier
cancer treatment [19].
• The Rand Corporation found that 150K soldiers suffering
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) do not seek
treatment [26]. Privacy concerns contribute to the highest
rate of suicide among active duty soldiers in 30 years.
